មនុស្សបុរេប្រវត្តិ ឌីនីសូវ៉ា


ការសាយភាយ និងវិវត្តន៍​នៃអម្បូរមនុស្ស Denisova ©Wikipeida En.

Denisova hominins ជា​អម្បូរ​ (species) ឬអនុអម្បូរ​ (subspecies) មនុស្ស​បុរេប្រវត្តិ​មួយអម្បូរ​ដែល​ដាច់​ពូជ​ទៅហើយ។ គេចាត់ទុក​អម្បូរនេះ​នៅ​ក្នុងសណ្ដាន (genus) Homo។ បច្ចុប្បន្ននេះ​ គេ​កំណត់​ឈ្មោះ​អម្បូរ​នេះ​ជា Homo sapiens. denisovan ឬ Homo sapiens. altai។ នៅ​ខែ​មិនាឆ្នាំ២០១០ អ្នកវិទ្យាសាស្ត្រ​បាន​ប្រកាស​ពី​​ការ​រកឃើញ​បំណែក​ឆ្អឹង​ម្រាម​ដៃ​ក្មេង​ស្រី​វ័យ​ជំទង់​ម្នាក់ដែល​ធ្លាប់រស់នៅកាលពី ៤១.០០០ឆ្នាំ​មុន នៅ​ក្នុង​ល្អាង Denisova នៅ​ប្រជុំភ្នំ Altai (អានថា៖ អាល់-តៃ មិនមែន អាត្លៃ) នៅ​ស៊ីបេរី។ អម្បូរមនុស្ស Neanderthal ​និងអម្បូរមនុស្ស​សព្វថ្ងៃ (Homo sapiens sapiens) ​ក៏ធ្លាប់រស់នៅក្នុងល្អាងនោះដែរ។

DNA មីតូកុងទ្រី នៃ​ឆ្អឹង​ម្រាម​ដៃ​នោះបង្ហាញ​​ហ្សែនប្លែក​ពីហ្សែន​អម្បូរ​មនុស្ស​ Neanderthal ​និងអម្បូរមនុស្ស​សព្វថ្ងៃ​។ ប្រព័ន្ធហ្សែននេះ​បង្ហាញ​ថា ​មនុស្ស​អម្បូរ Denisovan មានប្រភពរួមជាមួយនឹងមនុស្ស​អម្បូរ​ Neanderthal ដែល​លាត​សន្ធឹងពីស៊ីបេរី ទៅដល់អាស៊ីអាគ្នេយ៍ ហើយពួកគេរស់ និងរួមរស់​ជា​មួយ​ដូនតា​នៃ​​អម្បូរមនុស្ស​សព្វថ្ងៃ។ នៅ​ក្នុង DNA មនុស្ស​មេឡានេសៀន និងអូស្ត្រាលីដើម​មាន DNA អម្បូរមនុស្ស​ Denisovans ពី ៣% ទៅ ៥% ឯក្នុង​ DNA មនុស្ស​ប៉ាពូ មាន​ដល់ ៦%។

នៅ​ឆ្នាំ២០១៣ ការប្រៀបធៀប​ជាមួយ ប្រព័ន្ធហ្សែន (genome) នៃ​អម្បូរ​មនុស្ស Neanderthal នៅ​ល្អាង​ដដែល​នេះបង្ហាញ​ពី​ «ការបង្កាត់» ​ពីព្រោះនៅ​ក្នុងប្រព័ន្ធ​ហ្សែន​អម្បូរ​មនុស្ស Denisovan​ មាន​ DNA Neanderthal ដល់ទៅ​១៧%។ បន្ថែមពីនោះក៏មានភស្តុតាង​នៃ​ «ការបង្កាត់» ជាមួយ​អម្បូរមនុស្ស​បុរេប្រវត្តិ​មួយ​អម្បូរទៀតដែល​មិនទាន់កំណត់បាន។ ការ​វិភាគ DNA​ ដែល​បាន​មកពី​ធ្មេញ​ចំនួន​ ២ រក​ឃើញ​នៅ​ស្រទាប់​មួយ​ផ្សេងទៀត​​ពី​ឆ្អឹង​ម្រាម​ដៃ បង្ហាញ​ពី​កម្រិត​គម្លាត​រវាង DNA មីតូកុងទ្រី។ ធ្មេញទាំង ២ នេះ​ជាធ្មេញនៃសមាជិក ២ នាក់​​ផ្សេង​គ្នានៃ​ក្រុម​មនុស្ស​បុរេប្រវត្តិ​ដែល​រស់​នៅ​ក្នុង​ល្អាង​នេះ។

អម្បូរ​មនុស្ស​ Denisovan និង Neanderthal បាន​បែក​ចេញ​ពី​អម្បូរ​មនុស្ស​ Homo sapiens នៅ​រវាង ៧៤៤.០០០ ទៅ ៦០០.០០០ ឆ្នាំមុន ហើយឃ្លាត​ពី​គ្នា​ទៀត​នៅ​រវាង​ ២០០.០០០ ឆ្នាំ​ក្រោយមក។

ឈ្មោះ អម្បូរ អាយុ ទីតាំង និងឆ្នាំរកឃើញសំណល់ឆ្អឹង
Denisova 3 (aka X Woman) (ឆ្អឹងម្រាមដៃ) Homo sp. Denisovan/Neanderthal hybrid ~90 ka ល្អាង Denisova, 2012
Denisova 4 (ធ្មេញថ្គាម) Homo sp. 100 ka ល្អាង Denisova, 1984
Denisova 8 (ធ្មេញថ្គាម) Homo sp. 30–50 ka ល្អាង Denisova, 2008
Denisova 2 (ធ្មេញថ្គាម) Homo sp. 30–50 ka ល្អាង Denisova, 2000
Denisova 11 (aka Denny) (បំណែកឆ្អឹងដៃ ឬជើង) Homo sp. ល្អាង Denisova, 2010

កំណត់សម្គាល់ ka = 1.000

អត្ថបទដើម៖ Wikipedia: Denisovan

ព័ត៌មានមួយចំនួន៖

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បានផ្សាយ​ក្នុង អត្ថបទ នរវិទ្យា, អត្ថបទ បុរេប្រវត្តិ | បានដាក់ពាក្យ​គន្លឹះ , , , , | បញ្ចេញមតិ

តារាងប្រៀបធៀបអម្បូរនៃសណ្ដាន Homo


ឈ្មោះ កាលវេលារស់នៅ ទីតាំង កម្ពស់ ទម្ងន់ បរិមាណលលាដ៏ក្បាល ផ្សេងៗ
H. habilis 2,100 – 1,500 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ អាហ្វ្រិចខាងកើត 110-140 ស​.ម. 33–55 គ.ក. 510–660 ស.ម.គីប
H. rudolfensis 1,900 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ កេនយ៉ា 700 ស.ម.គីប ឃើញនៅ ២ ទីតាំង
H. gautengensis 1,900 – 600 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ អាហ្វ្រិចខាងត្បូង 100 ស.ម. រកឃើញ ៣ បុគ្គល
H. erectus 1,900 – 140 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ អាហ្វ្រិច អឺរ៉ាស៊ី 180 ស.ម. 60 គ.ក. 850 ស.ម.គីប (ដំបូង) – 1,100 ស.ម.គីប (ក្រោយមក)
H. ergaster 1,800 – 1,300 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ អាហ្វ្រិចខាងកើត និងខាងត្បូង 700–850 ស.ម.គីប ​H. erectus នៃអាហ្វ្រិច
H. antecessor 1,200 – 800 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ អឺរ៉ុបខាងលិច 175 ស.ម. 90 គ.ក. 1,000 ស.ម​.គីប ​គេគិតថា​អាច​ជា​ H. heidelbergensis
H. heidelbergensis 600 – 300 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ អាហ្វ្រិច អឺរ៉ុប 180 ស.ម. 90 គ.ក. 1,100 – 1,400 ស.ម.គីប
H. cepranensis 450 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ អ៊ីតាលី 1,000 ស.ម.គីប ​លលាដ៏ក្បាលតែមួយគត់ អាចជា H. erectus
H. rhodesiensis 300 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ ហ្សាំបៀរ 1,300 ស.ម.គីប គេគិត​ថាអាច​ជា​ H. heidelbergensis
H. naledi 300 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ អាហ្វ្រិចខាងត្បូង 150 ស.ម. 45 គ.ក. 450 ស.ម.គីប រកឃើញ ១៥ បុគ្គល​
H. sapiens 300 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ – បច្ចុប្បន្ន ទូទាំងពិភពលោក 150 – 190 ស​.ម. 50 – 100 គ.ក. 950 – 1,800 ស.ម.គីប រូបរាងមនុស្សបច្ចុប្បន្ន​
H. neanderthalensis 240 – 40 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ អឺរ៉ុប អាស៊ីខាងលិច 170 ស.ម. 55 – 70 គ.ក. (មាឌក្រអាញ) 1,200 – 1,900 ស.ម.គីប ​អាច​ជា​អនុអម្បូរ H. sapiens
H. floresiensis 190 – 50 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ ឥណ្ឌូនេស៊ី 100 ស.ម. 25 គ.ក. 400 ស.ម.គីប​ ​រកឃើញ ៧ បុគ្គល (ជាមនុស្សក្រិន)
H. tsaichangensis 100 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ តៃវ៉ាន់ រកឃើញ ១ បុគ្គល អាចជា H. erectus​
Denisova hominin 40 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ ស៊ីបេរី រកឃើញនៅ ១ ទីតាំង ​​អាច​ជា​អនុអម្បូរ H. sapiens ឬអម្បូរបង្កាត់
Red Deer Cave people 15–12 ពាន់ឆ្នាំ ភាគនិរតី ប្រទេសចិន ​អាច​ជា​អនុអម្បូរ H. sapiens ឬអម្បូរបង្កាត់

អត្ថបទដើម Wikipedia: Comparative table of homo species

បានផ្សាយ​ក្នុង អត្ថបទ បុរេប្រវត្តិ | បានដាក់ពាក្យ​គន្លឹះ , , , , | បញ្ចេញមតិ

PPP: The July 1997 shootout (2007)


Original content: The Phnom Penh Post: The July 1997 shootout

Michael Vickery | Publication date 27 July 2007 | 07:00 ICT

Four months later, on July 5, shooting erupted in and around Phnom Penh and continued for two days, at the end of which the armed units of FUNCINPEC had been routed. Several of their officers, including General Kroch Yoeun, noted above in connection with the 1994 coup attempt, had been killed, and another, also involved in the 1994 affair,

Nhiek Bun Chhay, commanding the FUNCINPEC forces, escaped and fled to the northwest border area. Prince Ranariddh, who had fled to Paris on July 4, was replaced as First Prime Minister by Mr. Ung Huot, who had returned to Cambodia for the UNTAC election after many years, including the Khmer Rouge period, in Australia.

This event, right up to the present, has been, with few exceptions, treated by the press, and even by card-carrying scholars, as a ‘bloody coup by strongman Hun Sen’ to oust Prince Ranariddh and destroy the FUNCINPEC party. In 1993 it was said that journalists swarmed into town hoping to see blood, and left disappointed. Now they saw some blood, and they certainly knew what to do with it -grease their own personal Vietnam syndromes by kicking a Cambodian leadership which, like Vietnam, had refused to kowtow.

‘Strong Man’ Hun Sen, they said, moved to wipe out his opposition because he feared the results of next year’s (1998) election, required by the constitution. UNTAC’s 2 billion was wasted, because it didn’t buy compliance with what the West wanted in Cambodia. Those FUNCINPEC figures who chose Hun Sen over Ranariddh were ‘quislings’, although when they returned to Cambodia after 1991 they were hailed as the best element of FUNCINPEC, as they no doubt were. Ung Huot, for example, had been highly praise for trying to impose greater discipline and efficiency in the Ministry of Education after formation of the Royal government in October 1993.

The CPP position after the events was that it had been an attempted coup by FUNCINPEC, with support from KR troops, to overthrow the CPP and Hun Sen, and a White Paper was published to this effect. This was rejected out of hand by the journos and by most of the Cambodia specialist crowd; but I discovered in visits to Phnom Penh later that the White Paper arguments were widely accepted among serious diplomats.

Perhaps the only journalist who attempted at the time to look at evidence from both sides was Barry Wain, who wrote, “in circumstances that remain disputed, Mr. Hun Sen’s military forces… defeated Prince Ranariddh’s troops in Phnom Penh”.

As noted at the beginning of this survey, other journalists who lacked Wain’s authority and independence surreptitiously held similar views, although in their published work they felt obliged to perform a hatchet job on a well-known researcher known for sympathy toward Hun Sen and the CPP180. The pro-CPP interpretation found its most prominent international supporter in Tony Kevin, Australian ambassador to Cambodia, who was in Phnom Penh at the time181.

Revelations and disinformation

For ‘human rights lawyer’ Brad Adams, however, in his disinformation ploy to the U.S. Senate, the mini-civil war of July 1997 was nothing but a putsch by Hun Sen, totally ignoring the evidence that the other side was equally prepared and that they may well have started the action. It is true, as Adams said, that “the home of… Ranariddh was surrounded and attacked”, but then it was serving as a command post for the anti-government forces, as is clearly seen in a film which they shot of themselves, later found by the government (Ranariddh himself had bugged out on July 4th and was on his way to France). There they appear relaxed and confident of their coming victory. Ly Touch, [Editor: Ly Touch defected to the CPP in March 2007] now a FUNCINPEC member of parliament, was on the phone, to foreign journalists, saying that Hun Sen had been killed by his bodyguards, evidently in preparation for an extra-judicial execution which they were planning.

This is one of the most stunning pieces of evidence for the interpretation of the events as a FUNCINPEC coup manque, and shows that it was not only, to quote Adams again, “senior FUNCINPEC military officials who were targeted for execution”. FUNCINPEC evidently had its own list of targets too, if they had won182.

Further support for the CPP interpretation came with the discovery of Khmer Rouge documents on their negotiations with Ranariddh and his colleagues. Phnom Penh Post published summaries of their important details in May 1998, quoting “An independent expert in Phnom Penh [who] describe[s] the papers as ‘politically explosive’ and possibly the ‘most important’ to have been found in Cambodia in recent times. Senior

CPP sources said the books were ‘priceless’ and would change not only Cambodians’ views of Hun Sen’s actions in July last year-but that of the world,”

Not surprisingly, I suppose, given that introduction, they were ignored by most of the important press organs and wire services. At the time I was in the United States and received the Phnom Penh Post article immediately by fax, after which I remained another week in the U.S., reading the New York Times every day, but found nothing there about this important revelation183.

Finally Phnom Penh Post made up for its gaffe in highlighting those papers by giving generous space to the spin doctors from UNTAC days, Stephen Heder and David Ashley, to interpret the importance of the ‘KR papers’ as merely demonstrating the lack of reality in the KR position, imagining that they could still play a role in Cambodian poltics184.

Escalation ignored

Totally ignored in the standard, anti-CPP, treatment was the build-up to the events of July 5-6. Although journalists cannot always be historians and sociologists, they must pay some attention or their simple-minded recording of the ‘facts’ of the moment (always partial because choices must be made, and therefore inevitably partisan) leads them into gross misinterpretations, not to say disinformation.

No doubt for journalists the 1980s are such ancient history that they cannot be accused of bias for forgetting them. All Cambodian political figures, however, know, and do not forget, that the entire so-cal1ed peace process evolution was intended to get rid of the CPP, even at the risk of giving the KR a place in the government.

The Paris Agreement and the 1993 election only came about because the PRK/SOC managed to defeat cruder schemes. And in spite of 2 billion dollars and a whole gaggle of experts, the conduct of balloting and counting was sloppy enough to give the CPP reason to claim fraud.

It is, however, disinformation just to say that Ranariddh won but Hun Sen refused to move out. As described above, the coalition was mandated by Paris and UNTAC rules concerning the new constitution; and the position retained by the CPP was in accord with its votes, 38% against 45%. This is the minimum background.

It was disinformation not to at least acknowledge in passing that in the weeks preceding the July 1997 affair Ranariddh boasted that he would use new KR allies to further his own policies, especially, and most dangerously, against Vietnam185. It was disinformation not to note that ever since 1993 the royalists had been plotting to undermine Hun Sen as much as he, no doubt, had been plotting to stay ahead of them. The post-election secession was under Ranariddh’s brother Chakrapong, just dumped by the CPP, and directly instigated by an important non-CPP higher-level personality. Hun Sen outplayed them and got credit for putting down the secession. All through 1994 various royalist schemes were hatched to undermine the CPP by bringing the KR into the government via a back door; and in July of that year a royalist coup was barely nipped in the bud. Even Steve Heder, no friend of the CPP, expressed dismay that FUNCINPEC “general Nhiek Bun Chhay plays footsie or worse with the likes of Ta Mok, Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea”186.

The royalists, moreover, seem to have got what they asked for. As argued in the CPP White Paper edited by a U.S. lawyer, and as supported by another American lawyer-journalist, Mike Fowler, who said, in his presentation of the case, that the royalists had been trying to provoke such an incident, apparently overconfident of success, and Hun Sen had a good legal case against them, if only he had resorted to the courts rather than to violence187. I wonder what courts he could have used. The Phnom Penh foreign community and the international press have condemned the Cambodian courts as nothing but rubber stamps for the government, they would have denounced any verdict in Hun Sen’s favor as dishonest; and probably no international court would have taken the case.

Finally, in the absence of inside information, a foreign observer must at least acknowledge that the July 1997 action was an explosion resulting from simmering hostility between the two sides which had been obvious for months.

Parts of this section were originally published as “A non-standard view of the coup”, Phnom Penh Post (PPP) 6/17, 29 Aug-11 Sept, 1997, p. 11; and in The Nation (Bangkok), 25 September 1997, p. A5 with the title “The real story of Cambodia cries out to be told”.

  • 179. Journo comment is too prevalent to require citation. For pseudo-scholarly work see Brown and Zasloff, pp. 239-240.
  • 180. See above, p. 12; and Matthew Grainger, “EU media guru says Ranariddh guilty,” a title in itself redolent of emotional prejudice, PPP 7/2, 30 January-13 February 1998, p. 2.
  • 181. Wain in Asian Wall Street Journal, 20-21, February 1998, p. 10, entitled “Salvaging Elections in Cambodia”. For a serious discussion of the position that the ‘coup’ may have started as an attempted putsch by Ranariddh’s forces, see Tony Kevin, “U.S. Errs in Cambodia Policy”, FEER 21 May 1998, p. 37; “Cambodia Prepares for National Elections”, The Asia-Pacific Magazine No. 9110, 1998; and “Support Cambodian Elections”, Christian Science Monitor Weekly 24-30 July, 1998, p. 16.
  • 182. I have discovered that this view is widespread among diplomats in Phnom Penh, although they refuse to make it public, and the evidence is well-known to the journalistic herd who, nevertheless, continue to bray on about ‘strongman Hun Sen’s bloody coup to oust Prince Ranariddh’, One detail which has been difficult to pin down is the statement in the government’s first White Paper that at 5 A.M. on July 5, Voice of America broadcast a taped message from Ranariddh that a coup against him was underway in Phnom Penh. At that time Ranariddh was on a plane to France, and nothing had yet happened in Phnom Penh. If the story was true it meant that FUNCINPEC was preparing a cover story for the putsch they were planning, and that some Americans were in on It. In December 2001 the ambassador of a respected western country which has no strategic, economic, or vengeance interests in Cambodia told me he was convinced that the story was true, because it had been confirmed for him by a person close to Ranariddh, one of the people seen clearly in the video which the FUNCINPEC leaders made of themselves early in the fighting when they believed they would win.
  • 183. PPP 7/10, May 22-June 4, 1998; see also a description of their discovery by Bou Saroeun and Peter Sainsbury, in Bou Saroeun, “The KR Papers”, PPP 11/15, July 19-August 1, 2002.
  • 184. Stephen Heder, “US must hold Hun Sen to higher standards than EU ” PPP, 7/12, June 19-July 2, 1998; David Ashley, PPP, Issue 7/13, July 3-16,1998, pp. 9,12.
  • 185. PPP, 5/10, 20 September-3 October 1996, “Ranariddh dismisses rumored CPP scheme”, and interview with Matthew Grainger, “Ranariddh: ‘KR will be very tough”‘, The same theme was implicit in the formation of the ‘National Union Front’ of FUNCINPEC and Sam Rainsy’s ‘Khmer Nation Party’, with participation in the celebration by 20 Khmer Rouge delegates from Ieng Sary’s ‘Democratic National Union Movement’, See Ker Munthit, “Smiles all round as one-time foes join handsin NUF”, PPP 6/5, March 7-20, 1997, p, 4
  • 186. Stephen Heder, “Khmer Rouge again slipping away from punishment”, a second installment of Heder’s edited testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, PPP 7/13, July 3-16, 1998.
  • 187. Mike Fowler, in PPP 12-24 July 1997, p. 11.
បានផ្សាយ​ក្នុង Michael Vickery | បានដាក់ពាក្យ​គន្លឹះ , , , , , | បញ្ចេញមតិ

PPP: Wrong on Gottesman (2005)


Original content: The Phnom Penh Post: Wrong on Gottesman

Michael Vickery | Publication date 28 January 2005 | 07:00 ICT

Luke Hunt’s review of Evan Gottesman’s book (Dec 31 – Jan 13, 05, p. 13) was one of the most dishonestly prejudiced things I have seen.

The first paragraph is not factual. In 1979 There was not yet an “elite” and no warning was then issued about them being “blinded by wealth”. “Rape and violations against women” were probably fewer than at any time in Cambodian history, except possibly under the KR, who, whatever their own sins, managed to keep those things at an absolute minimum. Not only are Luke Hunt’s statements inaccurate, they are not even what Gottesman, who is often dodgy on his own, said.

As for Gottesman “stamp[ing] his credentials on a period [1978-79] few authors have dared to touch,” Luke Hunt here exhibits ignorance of the rather voluminous literature on the period. In particular, the identity and role of Mat Ly, a Cham leader, is well known to all students of the period and is described in existing literature. Luke Hunt got it wrong again in calling him “the spiritual head of Cambodia’s Cham Muslims, the mufti Mat Ly.” He was neither a spiritual leader nor a mufti, nor does Gottesman say that. Mat Ly, as well as his father, were old-time Cham communists, who earlier opposed the French and of course at first joined the KR, just like everyone with leftist sympathies in 1975-76.

Again Luke Hunt goes beyond the facts with “The Vietnamese edited a new constitution beyond any recognition of its Cambodian authors,” which is non-factual, and not what Gottesman’s rather careful treatment of the constitution-drafting process permits. It is true that Gottesman edits his sources to give as anti-Vietnamese picture as possible, but his treatment does not permit Luke Hunt’s conclusion.

Luke Hunt might take a look at my analysis of the three drafts of the constitution in my book Politics, Economics, and Society in the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea, which, to be sure, has long been unavailable (although Gottesman knew it), but is now available in my authorized paperback pirate version in the little bookstore on the street between the Golden Gate Hotel and Tom’s bar.

Even if one Cambodian told Gottesman in 1997, repeat 1997, (his page 110) that the first draft was Cambodian and the next one “Yuon”, the comparison I did shows that was not true.

As for currency, whoever controlled it, they did a good job. The new currency quickly replaced the Dong, was generally accepted in the markets, and maintained its value better than the Dong until undermined in the post-1991 great leap into an uncontrolled free market, and the impact of UNTAC.

French and English were not banned, although not introduced immediately into the schools (although the medical school taught in French from the beginning), but private tuition gradually developed, especially in English, and by 1984 there was an entire street full of small, private English schools. The then Minister of Economy, Meas Samnang boasted to me in front of his Vietnamese adviser that one of his assistants was spreading his knowledge of English to young people through such work.

Hun Sen “reading the charges” against Pen Sovan is ludicrous. Hun Sen did not yet have such an exalted position. This is no doubt Pen Sovan’s special pleading, about which more below.

The “rumors about foul play” in Chan Si’s death no doubt came to Gottesman from Pen Sovan, and reveal one of the weak points in Gottesman’s book. Gottesman relied too much on interviews in the 1990s with people who revised their oral histories of the early 80s. The worst is Pen Sovan, whose May 1999 interview with Gottesman is one of his most important sources. One certain lie in Pen Sovan’s late testimony is his insistence (to, among others, Margaret Slocumb, The People’s Republic of Kampuchea 1979-1989, pp. 143-144) that Chan Si was killed by Hun Sen at a banquet in Phnom Penh in 1987, when the truth is that he went in 1984, very ill, to Moscow where he died in a hospital, where one of my oldest Cambodian friends visited him before his death.

Gottesman’s treatment of Chan Si’s death is embarrassing. He obviously got the same story from Pen Sovan, and apparently did not believe it. He wrote on page 134 that “to this day, Chan Si’s death … is clouded by rumors of foul play.” To some extent this is true. There are people who think his death was not natural, but I have heard of no one but Pen Sovan who denies he died in Moscow, but was killed by Hun Sen in Phnom Penh. Gottesman could not treat this subject honestly because it would have undermined Pen Sovan as a source, and thus undermined other details which Gottesman needed. Another relevant reference in Gottesman to Chan Si, on page 204, is “in December 1984, as Chan Si lay ill, Hun Sen began speaking …”

It is peculiar that Gottesman would not say “…lay ill in Moscow …”, no doubt through misplaced fidelity to Pen Sovan. Luke Hunt calls Chan Si “Hanoi-friendly Chan Si,” but those who still think his death was arranged impute it to his opposition to Vietnamese policies. Calling the 1980s “not always unlike the decade before” is perverse exaggeration.

There were no serious “attempts to banish urban populations,” although it would have been rational to do more to limit rapid immigration into the city. The K5 program was certainly unpopular and resulted in many deaths. But Luke Hunt goes far beyond Gottesman in comparing it to the KR, and Gottesman himself relied too much on the worst propaganda sources, such as Luciolli (see my review of her in the Post 04/08, 1995). Moreover, no western, especially American, critic of K5 should speak of it without acknowledging that Cambodia, and its Vietnamese supporters, were in fact forced to fight, even to the death, against enemies supported by the US, China, Thailand, etc.

Luke Hunt’s deepest descent into scurrility is “throughout the Vietnamese occupation, Cambodia was a reclusive state that ranked alongside North Korea.” Evidence against that is in the writings of the numerous foreign, western, journalists, researchers, and aid workers who traveled in, out and around Cambodia starting even in 1979, and increasingly from 1980-81, with increasing freedom, including yours truly. In 1981

I was able to drive with a colleague and an aid worker in a private vehicle from Phnom Penh to Battambang, then to Siem Reap, visit some of the temples there and return, with three to fours days in each town, and in Battambang a long interview-conference with the local governor, one of the Hanoi Khmer. Once more, the propaganda scam is not from Gottesman, whose only mention of North Korea was with reference to the KR.

Gottesman, like many latecomers (1990s, especially mid-to-late 90s), has sucked up stories from Cambodians with the anti-Vietnamese animus which has been growing in the last ten years, forgetting or denying what Vietnam did for them when they were just recovering from the KR. At its most extreme, this now leads some Cambodians, and increasingly, to even blame the disasters of the KR period on the Vietnamese

(Khieu Samphan’s line). Gottesman then, in spite of his extended research into genuine PRK documents, which treating specific problems of the day are not always clear about the total context, was able to interpret them as support for the anti-Vietnamese scene depicted by his informants, most of whom he met in 1997-1999.

One example is on Gottesman’s page 93. Writing of the refugee outflow in 1979, he says: “Cambodians voted with their feet. The lack of food compelled tens of thousands to head for the cities or for Thailand. … Peasants too, had no choice but to leave the cooperatives in search of food …”

First, this is not what the refugees at the border were saying when I talked to them in 1980; and second, the 1980 PRK document quoted by Gottesman, and which from my research seems factually true in the details it reports, is not, however, evidence for his statements. He has simply interpreted it to support oral information he got from some unreliable source.

A technical problem with Gottesman concerns his sourcing. Lacking a bibliography and without explanation of the locations of the documents he used, it presents great difficulty to other researchers whom might wish to recheck the same situations.

Another dubious facet in Gottesman is his reliance on Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia by Stephen Morris, a longtime right-wing hack and proven falsifier of documents. Whatever the problems in Gottesman’s treatment, Hunt has gone far beyond him in pursuing his anti-PRK and anti-Vietnamese line. His review in unworthy of even the Phnom Penh Post.

-Michael Vickery.

បានផ្សាយ​ក្នុង Michael Vickery | បានដាក់ពាក្យ​គន្លឹះ , , , | បញ្ចេញមតិ

PPP: Hayes sells paper, soul (2001)


Original content: The Phnom Penh Post: Hayes sells paper, soul

Michael Vickery | Publication date 27 April 2001 | 07:00 ICT

Dear Editor,

Phelim Kyne’s “CIDA plan slammed for political bias” (Phnom Penh Post 10/8, 13-26 April, 2001, p. 1) is the filthiest piece of pseudo-journalistic hack work and character assassination I have seen in years, except in some of the local press which is alleged to specialize in that sort of work for pecuniary advantage.

It also seems to mark an ideological shift back toward a position many suspected when PPP was founded, but which most of us over the years believed Michael Hayes was trying to avoid, by keeping his pages open to writing of varying opinions. That meant, of course, that opinion pieces should remain where they belong, in editorials and letters, or clearly labeled as opinion pieces, not presented as news stories.

Cambodia does not lack newsworthy subjects, and there is no need for this type of creative “man bites dog” non-news. A “storm of protest” is alleged over Longmuir’s appointment from “opposition legislators, human rights workers and representatives of civil society”. Who is cited? Only, by name, one opposition politician; or does Peter Shier, who in his career in Cambodia was openly a propagandist for FUNCINPEC, fit this category too?

Two human rights workers, or possibly representatives of civil society (it is not clear which hat Kyne wants them to wear here) cited by name are extremely circumspect. Lao Mong Hay is even said to have defended Longmuir’s use of his alleged close relationship with government leaders, and Chea Vannath adopts a wait and see attitude.

And what do the anti-Longmuir people say? That, according to Longmuir’s wife, he liked Cambodia so much he hoped to retire here. How utterly contrary to democracy and human rights. That he was friendly with Prime Minister Hun Sen and adopted a positive position toward the Cambodian government. Is that an illegitimate position for an ambassador? Do they imagine that ambassadors should give support to minority factions trying to overthrow the government? Certainly not when an opposition faction espouses a racist ideology of a type which Longmuir’s country, along with others, once fought a World War to oppose. Peter Shier should take heed here. Moreover, according to Shier, Longmuir’s views were those of other ambassadors.

“After the 1997 coup [to quote Shier’s outdated language], the great majority of Phnom Penh’s ambassadors had sided with the CPP, especially Hun Sen”. Why did the PPP not give weight to their opinions of Longmuir in assessing his worth for his new post?

In my own experience, the views imputed to Longmuir by Shier and PPP’s anonymous chorus are widespread, and since 1997 increasingly widespread, among the knowledgeable international community, including the ambassadors chided by Shier. This could have been the nucleus of a real news story, for it has never been adequately reported.

If most of the ambassadors agreed with Longmuir, who are the anonymous diplomats who allege that Longmuir’s conduct in 1997 “made a mockery of the…National Assembly”, or that his “expressions of political partiality… went far beyond the demands of realpolitik”, or that he “never showed any interest in developing a functional democracy”, or that he “turned a blind eye” to human rights problems? It might be interesting if their identities could be exposed and compared with the ambassadors who agreed with Longmuir. At least the PPP might have pressed them for exactly what Longmuir said or did to mock the Assembly, or go beyond realpolitik (this remark in itself deriving, perhaps in Kyne’s imagination, from a gratuitous personal insult by Shier), or against a functioning democracy.

As it stands none of this is worth the paper on which it is printed. I ignore the more personal slander, which the PPP should also have ignored, coming from sources which make that a specialty.

Over the last few years Michael Hayes has on occasion said that he wished to sell the Phnom Penh Post. Now I see that he has succeeded; and it is not only a newspaper which has been sold.

-Michael Vickery.

បានផ្សាយ​ក្នុង Michael Vickery | បានដាក់ពាក្យ​គន្លឹះ , , | បញ្ចេញមតិ